Jean Coulter v. Christine Studeny by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-10-2013 
Jean Coulter v. Christine Studeny 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Jean Coulter v. Christine Studeny" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 714. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/714 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-4464 
____________ 
 
JEAN COULTER, 
        Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTINE STUDENY; OFFICE OF THE BUTLER 
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; JEREMY 
STEWART; DENNIS HOERNER; THOMAS FORREST; 
THOMAS EIDENMULLER; WILLIAM R. SHAFFER 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-00060) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 5, 2013 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Jean Coulter appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing her 
amended complaint.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
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 The instant civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is one of many filed by Coulter in 
federal court challenging the validity of a condition of her probation that she have no contact 
with her minor daughter and a state court determination involuntarily terminating her parental 
rights, see generally Coulter v. Doerr, 486 Fed. Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2012); Coulter v. Ramsden, 
2013 WL 163970 (3d Cir. January 16, 2013); Coulter v. Butler County Children & Youth 
Serv., 2013 WL 363491 (3d Cir. January 31, 2013).
1
  In this action, Coulter sued Assistant 
District Attorney Christine Studeny and the Office of the Butler County District Attorney; 
Jeremy Stewart, Dennis Hoerner, Thomas Forrest and Thomas Eidenmuller of the 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole; and the Honorable William R. Shaffer, who 
presided over Coulter‟s criminal proceedings in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas. 
After Coulter filed an amended complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss it pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 
Recommendation, recommending dismissal of the amended complaint.  After Coulter 
submitted her objections to the report, the District Court, in an order entered on October 12, 
2012, dismissed the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  The District Court then denied 
Coulter‟s motion for reconsideration and for recusal in an order entered on November 8, 2012. 
                                              
1
 Coulter pleaded nolo contendere to one count of aggravated assault on May 11, 2007 in the 
Butler County Court of Common Pleas.  See Coulter, 486 Fed. Appx. at 227-28.  The victim of 
the assault was Coulter‟s minor daughter.  Coulter was sentenced by Judge William Shaffer to 
a term of imprisonment of 15-30 months, to be followed by 36 months of probation.  As a 
special condition of her probation, Coulter was precluded by Judge Shaffer from having any 
contact with her daughter.  Coulter‟s parental rights were terminated on January 11, 2011 
following a hearing in Orphans Court presided over by Judge Thomas Doerr, see id. (citing In 
re: Adoption of A.C., No. O.A. 57 of 2007).  Coulter was released from prison on January 25, 
2010, after serving her maximum sentence, and began serving her term of probation.  Although 
the instant action was filed while Coulter was still on probation, we note that her probation 
would have expired on or about January 25, 2013. 
3 
 
 Coulter appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In her brief on appeal 
Coulter challenges the order dismissing her amended complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, and the order denying her motion to recuse. 
 We will affirm.  We exercise plenary review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.  See 
Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001).  We “are free” to affirm the 
judgment “on any basis which finds support in the record.”  Bernitsky v. United States, 620 
F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).  Dismissal Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where the complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, such as where the defendants are immune from 
suit.  It is also proper where the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  
The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  Conclusory allegations are 
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 
210 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 In her amended complaint, Coulter alleged that just before she was released from prison 
Stewart imposed a sentence on her by forbidding her from residing in Philadelphia while she 
was on probation.  See Amended Complaint, at ¶ 9.  On January 26, 2010, she met with 
Hoerner and Forrest, who imposed another “new” sentence by adding other conditions to her 
probation.  See id. at ¶12.  She stated: “Hoerner and Forrest went on to explain that they had 
been in touch with Studeny and Shaffer.”  Id.  On January 28, 2010, she wrote to Eidenmuller 
to inform him of the actions of his subordinates and request his assistance, but he took no 
action.  See id. at ¶ 16.  Coulter stated that “it appears highly likely that Shaffer (perhaps acting 
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with Studeny), „master-minded‟ the crimes committed against Coulter, and perhaps duped 
Defendants Stewart, Hoerner and Forrest into being their „front men‟ in this case.”  Id. at ¶ 17) 
(emphasis in original).  Judge Shaffer was alleged to have held a hearing after-the-fact that 
“de-criminalized” the actions of Hoerner, Forrest, and Stewart.  Id.  Coulter sought $100 
million in damages and injunctive relief. 
 Coulter‟s amended complaint properly was dismissed in its entirety under Rule 
12(b)(6).  Judge Shaffer is absolutely immunized from a suit for money damages arising from 
his judicial acts in connection with the conditions of Coulter‟s probation, including his 
imposition of the “no-contact” order.  Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam); 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978).  Assistant District Attorney Studeny is 
absolutely immunized from a suit for money damages arising from her prosecutorial acts in 
connection with the conditions of Coulter‟s probation.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
422–23 (1976).  The amended complaint contains no allegations that the District Attorney‟s 
Office initiated a plan, policy or custom that violated Coulter‟s constitutional rights, and thus 
this defendant properly was dismissed as well.  Monell v. Dep‟t of Social Services of City of 
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
Coulter‟s vague allegations of a conspiracy between Judge Shaffer and Studeny on the 
one hand and the probation defendants on the other, to unlawfully impose conditions on her 
probation, do not satisfy the plausibility standard, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, because, to 
properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a 
conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.  D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
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Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir.1992).  No agreement can be inferred from the 
conclusory allegations in Coulter‟s amended complaint.  
Similarly, Coulter‟s allegations that Stewart, Hoerner and Forrest imposed conditions on 
her probation that amounted to new or additional sentences are insufficient to state a claim for 
relief.  The no-contact order was imposed by Judge Shaffer, not by the probation defendants.  
The curfew that ran from 10:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m., and the requirements to avoid anyone 
with a drug problem and to undergo a psychological evaluation, are also conditions imposed by 
the court, as established by the criminal records attached to the probation defendants‟ motion 
to dismiss.  See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 
1196 (3d (Cir. 1993) (court may consider matters of public record in deciding motion to 
dismiss).  And, although Coulter alleges that she was initially required to reside in Butler 
County, and that this was not a court-ordered condition of probation, she failed to show that 
this temporary restriction rose to the level of a constitutional violation of any kind.  See Renfro 
v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011) (dismissal of complaint proper where 
pleader fails to allege facts sufficient to raise right to relief above speculative level).  Coulter 
states in her brief on appeal that she was able to get this condition lifted and she then moved to 
Philadelphia.  See Appellant‟s Brief, at 8.  Moreover, the record does not suggest that Coulter 
was ever charged with, or convicted of, violating the conditions of her probation.  The 
amended complaint properly was dismissed as to probation supervisor Eidenmuller because 
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be imposed on a supervisor on the basis of respondeat 
superior.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).   
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Last, there was no basis for the recusal of either the District Court or the Magistrate 
Judge.  We have previously rejected Coulter‟s attacks on the impartiality of the Magistrate 
Judge, see Coulter, 486 Fed. Appx. at 229; Coulter, 2013 WL 163970, at * 4, and we do so 
again here.  Coulter‟s attack on the impartiality of the District Court is also completely lacking 
in merit. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing 
Coulter‟s amended complaint and denying her motion to recuse.  The motions to summarily 
affirm filed by some of the appellees are granted.  Appellant‟s motion to strike and motion for 
sanctions are denied.  Appellant‟s emergency petition for change of venue/recusal is denied. 
 
 
